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‘New’ nations: Resource-based development imaginaries in Ghana and 
Ecuador 
1. Introduction 
Throughout recent history, the discovery of oil, gas, metals and minerals has provided a series of 
moments for imagining the development futures of resource-rich states. One modality of this – the 
articulation of national development plans and strategies – are constructed as particular types of 
political and economic imaginary for maximising the benefits of resource extraction. In the 
contemporary period, a language of ‘newness’ and a reinvigoration of the rhetoric of ‘nationalism’ 
has emerged to describe both a return of the state (away from the imperatives of neoliberal 
governance agendas) in the management of extractive resources and to imagine novel ways of 
determining and distributing the benefits of those same resources. In Colombia for example, the 5 
year development plan, subtitled ‘everyone for a new country’, is ‘aimed at[…]growth[…]outside of 
the extractive sectors’1 whilst Ecuador speaks of a development strategy iterated as ‘La Patria 
Nueva’ (the new nation).2  
Yet it remains the case that not only has this discursive emergence of ‘new resource nations’ been 
examined critically to a limited degree, but also that studies of the political economy of extractivism 
and its critique ‘neo-extractivism’, have, for the most part, failed to emphasise the role of political 
imaginaries in their arguments. Against this background, this paper critically examines the claims to 
novelty invoked by proclamations of ‘new’, resource-led development futures by examining the 
resource-based development imaginaries of Ghana and Ecuador. In both cases, the governments in 
these countries discursively mobilise resources in a multidimensional language that (re)asserts 
national control, energy security as well as more evenly distributed resource wealth. 
As the state asserts these development imaginaries with an increased role for itself – so-called 
‘resource nationalism’ – there exists the attendant need to create a sense of legitimacy. In Ghana’s 
case this is through a historical excavation of the discursive, socialist past of nation building in order 
to legitimate current calls for increased state control of resource revenues as codified, for example, 
in ‘local content law’. In Ecuador, the state is legitimised by imagining a future which attempts to 
move its economy away from resource dependence and instead invests in education and knowledge 
production. In its national development plan’s own words, it is a strategy which ‘aims to turn an 
economy based on finite natural resources into one based on infinite resources, through 
scientific[…]knowledge’.3 By analysing these two cases, their differences notwithstanding, this paper 
argues that the study of the political process of nationalising extractive resources must emphasise 
the politics of language to a greater degree. They show, in different ways, how resource extraction is 
mobilised as ‘an active moment in the construction of specific geopolitical imaginaries’4 and they 
highlight how language is used to legitimate state-led, resource-based development. This point is 
important because it shows the ways in which development ‘imaginaries’ are made – national 
development strategies are framed either with reference to an imagined past marked by reverence 
(as, we argue, is the case in Ghana), or to the future (as, we will show, in Ecuador).  
By highlighting the importance of the political dimensions of language, this paper adds to recent 
edited volumes which have considered the return of the developmental state in struggles over 
extractive resource sovereignty from a political economy perspective.5 The development imaginaries 
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being analysed here can be seen to be representative of the rhetorical ambitions of a ‘new politics of 
development’, characterised by structural transformation which has, following a wave of post-
neoliberalism in Latin America, defined the development agenda in Africa in the current decade.6 In 
order to show the ways in which the historical discourse of state-led development is repackaged and 
mobilised to imagine national, resource-based development futures, two significant bodies of text 
are analysed. In the Ghanaian context, we analyse a sample of ‘State of the Nation’ parliamentary 
addresses made between 2001 and 2015, in particular focusing on the last 5 years of these which 
followed oil and gas discoveries in the country. In the second instance, we examine developments 
arising out of Ecuador’s five year development plan, the Good Living National Plan 2013-2017. This 
builds on the vision found in the Good Living National Plan 2009-2013. Prior to the election of Rafael 
Correa in 2006 and the subsequent new Constitution of 2008, there was a period of intense political 
and economic instability, with seven presidents in the decade 1996-2006, alongside an ideological 
climate which militated against long-term, transformative development planning. 
Structurally, we proceed in section 2 by outlining critical work on ‘new developmentalism’ in 
extractive states. By engaging with this work, we show how a cultural critique can strengthen and 
support a burgeoning literature that has exposed the limitations of the discourse of state-led 
extractivism seen as ‘progressive’ or ‘sustainable’. Section 3 critically details the case of Ghana, 
whilst section 4 engages with the Ecuadorean context. We conclude with some thoughts on what an 
expanded reading of the ‘return of state’ - one that emphasises the role of political imaginaries - 
means for nation-states following development models based, in one way or another, on resource 
extraction.   
2. Neo-extractivism: extending the theory conceptually and empirically 
Historically, the ways in which the export-led growth model based on high prices for extracted 
commodities has been critiqued are multifarious. These have ranged from Raul Prebisch’s seminal 
treatise from the 1950s that warned in favour of industrialization and against the perils of 
dependency on primary commodity exports7 to the more recent, heavily theorised debates which 
have centred on the contention that resource abundance counter intuitively represents a curse.8 
Although the conclusions reached by these studies vary both in their empirical focus and the relative 
strength of the relationship between resources and growth, they are all written with a heavy 
(political) economic bias. This standpoint is symptomatic of a literature which has tended to eschew 
critical engagement with the cultural ways in which resource presence and relative abundance is 
imagined and rhetorically mobilised by the state in planning for sustainable development.  
In the contemporary period, resource extraction retains a strong association with forward-facing 
imaginaries of ‘progress’ and the potential for favourable economic growth. From the recent 
narrative trope that Africa is ‘rising’9 to recent literature that sees the continent’s ‘new oil’ as part of 
a ‘future fortune’10 the implication is that development and resource extraction can be viable and 
progressive bedfellows. Similarly in Latin America, resource extraction, complete with its vast 
assemblages of human, non-human and infrastructural components, continues to form both a 
present and future ‘extractives complex’ in spite of shifting geographies.11  
At the global policy level, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) announced in 
the opening paragraphs of its 2015 ‘Economic Report on Africa’ that, ‘industrialization promises to 
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address the paradox [of poverty coexisting with robust growth] by promoting…efficient utilisation of 
abundant physical and mineral resources and in the process eliminate poverty and hence 
structurally transform African economies’.12 In seeking to address the inequalities brought about by 
neoliberal development in resource-rich states, such a position almost perfectly defines the 
formation of the contemporary post-neoliberal condition of ‘new developmentalism’ or ‘new/neo- 
extractivism’. This consensus has been premised on ‘the economics and politics of natural resource 
extraction…fostering a more socially inclusive form of development’.13 It is also emblematic of the 
returning presence of the state in the resource politics of export-led economic growth14 which, in 
marking a supposed departure from previous iterations of the developmental state, has ushered in 
‘new mechanisms for social inclusion and welfare’.15  
As Burchardt and Dietz recently establish, neo-extractivism is characterised ‘by the renaissance of 
the developmental state, which[…]appropriates extra revenue and mediates between diverging 
interests[…],acts as an agent of development and[…]creates political legitimacy for itself through 
democratic elections and a development narrative’.16 Although neo-extractivism as a term remains a 
fairly recent iteration, predominantly popularized through the work of Eduardo Gudynas17, 
conceptually it has been predominantly analyzed as either a challenge to development theory18 or as 
an effective alternative to the neoliberal economic ordering of the extractive economy.19  
For some critics, it continues, rather than challenges, the patterns of accumulation previously 
associated with neoliberal resource extraction. Indeed, whilst the shift towards the post-neoliberal 
state promised to begin a ‘twenty-first century socialism’ and, in the words of Ecuadorian President 
Rafael Correa, to ‘end the neoliberal night’20, substantive changes to the development model which 
it seeks to replace are lacking. Thus, the argument follows that in spite of the strong rhetorical shift 
to the political left, the structural transformation associated with neo-extractivism has failed to 
materialize. Rather, it can be seen as ‘continuity at change21, firmly entrenched within a logic of old 
extractivism despite a break from ‘traditional’ neoliberalism22 and, more radically, part of the 
‘imperialism of the twenty-first century’.23 The latterly deployed language of imperialism echoes 
Harvey’s geographical treatment of ‘accumulation by dispossession’24 and is applied to cases in 
Bolivia25 as well as Latin America more generally.26  
However, these studies share two trends in terms of their foci, one conceptual and one empirical, 
which this paper seeks to address and expand upon. First, although political legitimacy is created 
through ‘a development narrative’ (as noted in the Burchardt and Dietz’s definition of neo-
extractivism), largely missing from these analyses is any critical engagement with how that process 
of legitimization takes place. It ignores the assertion that the construction of the ‘neo-extractivist’ 
state is simultaneously and ontologically cultural and political where the politics of language itself 
and a ‘concern with meaning making’ is emphasised27. The act of foregrounding the discursive 
modalities of legitimation as we do here through the study of development narratives in Ghana and 
Ecuador, is to attend to this shortcoming. 
At the policy level, the importance of legitimisation is usually only suggested implicitly. However, 
proceedings at the 2013 UNECA conference made this crucial point more explicit where it asserted 
that ‘the Developmental State must be based on legitimacy’.28 Our studied cases of Ecuador and 
Ghana both select and investigate the ways in which the national imaginary legitimises particular 
approaches to extracting resource rents. Collectively, they emphasise the political nature of 
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‘extractive imaginaries’ – to be thought of here as an adaptation of work in science and technology 
studies as ‘powerful cultural resources that help shape social responses to [resource extraction]’.29 
Although imaginaries never fully determine development policy, they nonetheless help to shape it, 
infused as they are by cultural ways of understanding the world geographically, environmentally and 
geopolitically. For example the Peruvian Amazon’s construction as ‘marginal and empty’, discursively 
positioned in contrast to a ‘coastal mestizo society which is seen as the cradle of the nation’ can be 
read as part of a geographic imaginary that has led to misrecognition of Amazonian voices from 
equitable policy treatment30. Additionally, competing ways of imagining nature have led to a politics 
of contention and environmental struggle in numerous cases ranging from Central Appalachia31 to 
contemporary Bolivia.32 Our intention is to show how the analysis of political imaginaries can 
strengthen the study of neo-extractivism.  
In addition to this conceptual contribution, this paper secondly attends to an empirical lacuna – the 
general absence of cases from outside of Latin America. Across the literature, neo-extractivism is 
parsed as a ‘Latin American phenomenon’33 and is used as short-hand for the ‘pink tide’ of emerging 
leftist governments on the continent in recent years.34 However, by focusing on the increase in the 
rhetorical importance given to state involvement in resource based development, it is possible to 
think through the concept’s utility more globally. The present study addressing of the Ghanaian 
context adds to a nascent literature that has only just begun to address the new geographies of neo-
extractivism that range from Africa35 to the global North.36 Even in these cases though, neo-
extractivism is usually described in a negative register, dismissed as little more than old-style 
extractivism.  
This article proceeds by analysing the iteration of development plans and pathways in Ghana and 
then Ecuador. In the following section, Ghana’s post-independence ‘State of the Nation’ addresses 
are analysed before Ecuador’s development plan of ‘La Patria Nueva’ is interrogated in section 4. By 
examining the cultural dimensions of national development strategies more prominently, both 
instances offer critiques of a narrow political-economy reading of neo-extractivism. In the Ghanaian 
case, we first highlight how particular mechanisms and themes are used to legitimate the state’s 
extractive policies. Then, in the following case from Ecuador, the contemporary possibilities of 
creating an ‘infinite’ knowledge based economy out of a ‘finite’ reliance on extraction are assessed 
in order to show how a language of legitimation translates into substantive, structural 
transformation in that country. 
3. The Discourse of Legitimacy: Structural transformation in Ghana’s ‘State of the 
Nation’ addresses  
‘Ghana, the black star of Africa, is on the rise again!’37 
State of the nation (SOTN) addresses describe the comprehensive speeches given by a country’s 
head of state to its legislature on an annual basis and reflect upon its economic, social and 
environmental standing. As such, they can be seen as perhaps the key discursive moment for 
imagining a country’s development future and, in many cases, are often framed with reference to 
specific national development plans and strategies. In Ghana, we studied all SOTN addresses 
between their introduction by President John Kufuor in 2001 and their most recent iteration in 2015. 
We focus much of the analysis on those addresses made between 2010 and 2015, where oil 
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discovery has been used as a moment to most explicitly imagine the ‘new’ nation.  By privileging a 
cultural critique of these speeches, we identify three crucial discursive turns that show how the neo-
extractivist nation is imagined and legitimised by the Ghanaian state. Firstly, neo-extractivism is 
associated with both the rebirth and progress of the nation – or, what we term a ‘politics of 
potential’. Secondly, religion and cultural tradition is used to ‘bless’ development futures founded on 
state-led resource extraction. Finally, the discourse of a unified ‘single-nation’ is mobilised in order 
to legitimise neo-extractivist development. In order to analyse the discursive strategies of the 
resource state, we draw upon Van Leeuwen’s categorization of a language of legitimation38 which 
shows how extractive ‘systems of authority’ (such as the Ghanaian state) ‘attempt to establish and 
cultivate the belief in its legitimacy’.39  
As Van Leeuwen asserts, in delineating his model for analysing the strategies of legitimation by the 
state (and other dominant actors), ‘language is…the most important vehicle for these attempts’.40 In 
the following subsections, it is shown how such a focus on the politics of language can highlight 
emergent themes that highlight the ways in which the economic imaginary of an extractive-led 
development future is defined and legitimised.  
a) The politics of potential 
‘Keep quiet and listen. The change and transformation is starting.’41  
An almost universal theme that runs throughout the discourse of resource politics in SOTN addresses 
in Ghana is the forward facing and transformative possibilities that extractive-led development 
offers. Whether this is in reference to recent oil discoveries or the use of gold stocks, resources are a 
foundational part of the country’s development imaginary. Highlighted in terms of their newness, 
the language of national, resource-led extraction is part of what we term here as a ‘politics of 
potential’. For example, President Mahama’s 2014 SOTN begins by imagining the structural ‘change’ 
of Ghana’s contemporary economy to be in part defined by greater national control of its resource 
sectors; it will ‘propel us forward, as a nation, to all that lies ahead’.42 This language of potential 
simultaneously includes notions of erstwhile underdevelopment and the promise and future 
possibility for resource-based growth. 
Yet, this narrative of ‘propulsion’ is discursively mapped onto a linear narrative of progress by 
invoking modernisation theory; As the 2010 SOTN address asserted, ‘exploitation of crude oil and 
gas are positioning Ghana for a major industrial take-off’.43 What follows in this speech are a series 
of measures for resource-led growth that strongly echo Rostow’s ‘stages of growth’ thesis (Rostow 
1971). Notwithstanding the longstanding and widespread academic critiques of the model, the 
repeated references made to ‘accelerated resource development’44 reinforce and legitimise this 
position of aspiration. It is an example of ‘theoretical rationalization’ whereby resource based 
growth is referenced by the state as ‘a natural order of things’45. In other words, (state) 
development of newly discovered extractive resources is presented as a necessary condition for 
growth. To not follow this pathway is to display ‘a fallen sense of selflessness and patriotism’46, and 
is, by extension, a politically unsustainable position. By accepting state control and management of 




The repeated forward-facing references found in this politics of potential attempt to place and 
represent resources as real, exploitable and controllable. The discourse of extractive-led 
development both imagines and then represents its (finite) natural resources as full of economic 
promise not only in Ghana but also across the African continent. For example, senior political figures 
in Tanzania invoke the potential of gas to ‘change the country into a better place to live’.47 
Referencing oil’s possible impact on Uganda’s agricultural development, ‘the message of positivity 
should be taken out to the streets that…the black gold under the ground can be transformed into 
green gold above the ground’.48 The ‘future’ in these proclamations is nearly always articulated 
without reference to an upper time limit, promising an open-ended imaginary of sustainable 
resource wealth but perhaps belying a lack of certainty and control. As we are reminded from 
cultural studies, it is precisely in these linguistically undefined spaces where ideas of ‘nationness…or 
cultural value are negotiated’.49 Such discursive vagueness is, of course, politically expedient in so far 
as it allows aspirational claims to development to be made freely and without evidence. The 
freedom to make political claims is enhanced by the materiality of resources mobilized for 
extraction; metals and minerals are often out of sight deep underground, whilst gas and oil 
discoveries such as those in Ghana may be offshore and ‘unseen’. Their relative ‘invisibility’ allows 
the state to project hope and prosperity out of the future promise of resource wealth as well as from 
resource extraction in the present. 
Future-facing iterations of resource-led development also have a relationship with development 
histories and the past. In Ghanaian SOTN addresses, for example, repeated references invoke the 
successes and rhetorical strength of the nation’s first president and national icon Kwame Nkrumah 
in order to legitimise the present and future trajectories of its development. Thus, Nkrumah’s legacy 
is recalled as being ‘of blessed memory, seeking to break this vicious cycle [of private controlled 
resource]’ by ‘establishing numerous state-owned industries’.50 In the present context of resource-
based development, it follows that it is a political imperative to ‘pursue Nkrumah’s dream of an 
integrated bauxite and alumina industry’.51 This, too, is a form of authority legitimation where 
references to status figures with historical value help establish the legitimacy of present policy 
choices. It is the very fact that Nkrumah-as-expert recommended a certain approach to Ghanaian 
resource policy, rather than argument or evidence, which renders it ‘a good idea’.52 In other words, 
legitimacy is provided by status rather than the content of the policy. 
b) Religious and traditional authority for a ‘blessed’ resource nation  
A second major way in which the state legitimates resource-based development is through 
discursive strategies that emphasise the role of religion. Recent scholarship has noted how 
development studies and religion both concern themselves with the idea of prosperity and progress 
in one form or another.53 In Ghana, proclamations from the president that link the idea of resource-
led development on the one hand and religious will on the other are commonplace. For example, 
speaking about the national oil development bill in 2014, Ghana is urged that: 
‘we cannot falter and we must not be afraid, because God is on our side, and the holy book says if 
god is for us, who can be against us’.54 
Such a reference resurrects the decades-old assertion that religion provides a moral framework for 
understanding processes of development.55 In other words, it ‘provides sets of norms with which to 
assess [development’s] legitimacy and validity’.56 From this perspective, the discursive positioning of 
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religious assent for state-controlled resource extraction recognises that religious belief is a 
fundamental part of the value system that informs people’s understanding of the development 
process. As Deneulin and Rakodi point out, ‘because religion is an important force that shapes 
people’s values, what they consider worthwhile and valuable, it is integral to social, political and 
economic life’.57  
Throughout the speeches studied, repeated references are made to the ‘blessing’ and ‘divine right’ 
of Ghana to mobilise its extractive resources sector for the benefit of growth.58 This is the case 
regardless of the specific resource under consideration. In examples ranging from the historical 
discoveries of gold, oil and natural gas, the message is made clear: Ghana must follow an extractivist 
logic precisely because ‘God is willing’.59 Here, ‘God’ functions as the ultimate role model, expert and 
guide for resource-based development through a form of authority legitimation. The state has God’s 
blessing and so, naturally, is laying out the right pathway for development to take place. As far back 
as 2003, the president urged the nation to ‘keep praying’ for offshore oil,60 in the hope of guidance 
over apposite pathways to development. This echoes a political background in the last decade that 
has seen widespread ‘thanks’ given to God for his ‘gift’ of oil to Ghana.61 
Religion’s discursive coupling with extractivism is a more specific extension of recent scholarship 
that has focused on the relationship between religion and nationalism. Addressing a gap in the 
literature on nationalism more generally, this work highlights the absence of religion from 
theorizations of nationalism that have focused on economic factors.62 It foregrounds, for example, 
the instrumental ways in which ‘national leaders try to draw on religion to create a cohesive public 
body’.63 In the context of this paper, the Ghanaian presidency repeatedly invokes religion to 
legitimate local content policy (LCP) in the country’s nascent oil sector. LCP is only one strategy used 
to structurally transform the economy in Ghana but it aims to maximise and capture benefits from 
the extractive industry sectors. However, it is not legitimized merely through appeals to economic 
efficiency but also through its approval by divine forces. As the president stated in 2013, ‘we will 
proceed with local content legislation to ensure Ghanaian participation in this blessing of nature God 
has bestowed on us’.64 In this regard, LCP is not only a series of interventions developed in the best 
interests of the nation, but also consecrated by God. Thus, the implication is that the act of failing to 
support LCP is to simultaneously miss out on its economic benefits and to turn down an invitation to 
‘participate’ in God’s ‘nature’. It serves to discursively legitimize so-called resource nationalism, 
coupling ‘resources’ and ‘nation’ in such a way as to unify Ghana’s approach to its development.   
c) Rationalising the one-nation resource state 
A third way in which Ghanaian state of the nation addresses helps to legitimise a neo-extractivist 
imaginary is through the validation and reification of the nation itself. Ghana is conceptualised and 
articulated as ‘one nation’, united in its approach to resource based development. For example, 
while discussing oil and gas discoveries it was made clear how a ‘commitment to a Ghana-first 
approach’ to resource management should be enacted ‘wherever the national interest can better be 
served that way’.65 In discursively positioning the nation and its ‘interest’ in the singular, it recalls 
the enduring strength of nationalism as ‘the most universally legitimate value in the political life of 
our time’.66 It evokes the past of discursive and substantive nation-building undertaken by Nkrumah 
and others which is heralded as a ‘proud time’ which recalls ‘our leading role in African liberation’.67  
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In the 2014 state of the nation address, President John Mahama explicitly stated that the notion of 
‘responsible citizenship’ is important to pushing through structural transformation of the economy.68 
He concludes that ‘Ghanaians are, at our core, the same people we were on March 6, 1957 when we 
became a free nation’ and that ‘being made in Ghana’ should be seen as a source of ‘pride’.69 The 
implication is that a more inclusive value chain for resource extraction with greater ‘local content’ is 
a continuation of the guiding principles of what it means to be Ghanaian as laid out by its celebrated 
founding father(s). Thus, it follows that ‘the pettiness of politics’ should be avoided, and that 
questioning new directions for resource policy is tantamount to being ‘unpatriotic’ – an untenable 
position for dissenters. In linguistic terms, it represents another form of ‘rationalisation legitimation’ 
where reference to the goals of social action is presented as a natural order of things and where 
disavowal to those aims is unthinkable. One state of the nation address explicitly details these 
ramifications: 
‘The instant we allow ourselves to fall prey to…the small-mindedness of doomsayers and people 
who actively wish for the failure of any action or policy intended to lift Ghana up [such as oil and gas 
policy], we turn our backs on that love and in so doing, we betray our own homeland’.70  
Having shown some of the ways in which the state discursively legitimates a commitment to 
resource extraction, the following section focuses on Ecuador and offers a related example of how, 
in substantive terms, ‘new’ resource nations are imagined. It shows how the development imaginary 
of structural transformation in Ecuador moves away from resource extraction and towards a 
knowledge economy in its attempts to both discursively and substantively construct the ‘new 
nation’.  
4. Ecuador: Constructing La Patria Nueva 
Since the production of oil began in 1972, Ecuador has been an oil-dependent country. Between 
2000 and 2012 oil made up fifty-five per cent of total exports and twenty-nine per cent of 
government revenues.71  Observers have noted its centrality to the political identity of the nation 
where it ‘has shaped visions of the boundaries, potentialities, and character of the Ecuadorian 
nation-state’.72  Much international academic writing focuses on its current form of neo-extractivism 
in the present timeframe, and, in particular, on its impact on indigenous communities, on the 
environment, and often from a post-development perspective.73 However, what is not highlighted is 
the government’s long-term, strategic vision for the future. This is the structural transformation of 
the economy from a primary commodity exporter to a knowledge economy over a forty to sixty year 
period.74 As the government’s national development plan 2013-17 states ‘our aim is to … leap 
forward from an economy of finite (material) resources-based economy to an economy based on 
infinite-based resource: knowledge.’75 In other words, ‘the government aims to employ extractivism 
to abandon extractivism.’76 
Building on the previous section’s analysis, it is shown here how, since coming to office in 2007, the 
government of President Correa has translated its ambitious vision into practice. This development 
imaginary rejects the country’s history of dependency in all its forms, including knowledge 
dependency, in order to experience a second independence77. Ecuador is home to one of the most 
biodiverse habitats in the world and the aim is to exploit these ‘natural laboratories’ with the 
country’s own human talent.78 Yet there remains considerable debate about how it can navigate its 
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own social knowledge imaginary of a public commons within a global cognitive capitalism which 
privatises and commodifies knowledge. As Ramirez Gallegos, Secretary of Higher Education, Science, 
Technology and Innovation, has argued, the challenge is to break ‘the only role that is reserved to 
the Southern countries…of being consumers of the science, creation and innovation of the North.79  
Such structural transformation has been made possible, in the first instance, by re-constructing the 
concept of a democratic developmental state, a characteristic part of the neo-extractivism 
undergoing a general ‘renaissance’ across the continent.80 The Ecuadorian state emphasises notions 
of autonomy, capacity and legitimacy. It has stressed the importance of autonomy vis a vis 
international actors for a peripheral development state by setting up the Commission for Public 
Credit Audit (CAIC) in 2007.81 On the basis of its report, the government re-negotiated its debt 
payments, saving the country $2.2 billion plus $7 billion in interest until 2030. In 2006 debt servicing 
was 24% of the budget, by 2012 this was 4%.82 Having ‘won back’ some sovereignty and resources, 
the government built the bureaucratic capacity of the state to plan and implement a development 
imaginary. As its 2013-17 national plan states:                            
‘We are emphasizing planning to avoid duplicating efforts and wasting resources, as 
occurred and so damagingly held us back during the neoliberal period. Planning was 
neglected and minimized during that period. Those governments ignored planning because 
of their ideology, but also because of their economic interests.’83  
Finally, Ecuador’s embracing of a new developmentalism asserts its legitimacy through both 
democracy and the material success of its developmental project. President Correa was re-elected in 
2013 on an absolute majority of the vote, 53 per cent, with a 34 point lead over his nearest rival.  His 
party secured 100 out of the 137 seats in the National Assembly.  Voter turn-out was over 80 per 
cent in both elections.  In July 2015 Correa’s approval ratings stood at 66 per cent.84  As Ecuador’s 
Culture Minister, Guillaume Long, summed up recently: ‘The government’s ongoing popularity … 
stems from the program of Ecuador’s Citizens’ Revolution, which since 2007, has been successfully 
driving economic growth and social inclusion through public investment. In doing so it has rejected 
the neoliberal dogma’.85 ‘Economic development as a primary logic of legitimacy’ is central to a 
developmental state.86 
In Ecuador, the flagship project of the government’s knowledge economy is the creation of a new 
city of knowledge, Yachay, named after the indigenous Quechua word for knowledge. It is the first 
planned city in Ecuador’s post-colonial history and is located 115 kilometres north of the capital, 
Quito. It is a thirty-year project with over $1 billion of investment and has been described by 
President Correa as the most important achievement of his government. As Moser et al point out: 
‘Building new planned cities is a strategy used by states to stimulate economic development as well 
as instil a sense of loyalty and pride in the population’.87 By bringing together the symbolism of 
tradition, authenticity and indigeneity inferred by Yachay with a forward-facing ‘triple helix’ urban 
hub of academic, private and public sector research and innovation, legitimacy is asserted. At the 
heart of this structural transformation lie the links between past and future, a strategy employed 
elsewhere in Ecuador. For example, Burbano de Lara has shown how Correa links building la Patria 
Nueva to the same historic mission of Bolivar and Alfaro in liberating the continent.88 Many 
observers have discussed how the national development plans have been inspired by the Andean 
indigenous worldview of Sumak Kawsay.89   
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Yachay has drawn closely on South Korea’s master planned city, Songdo, within the Incheon Free 
Economic Zone (IFEZ). IFEZ is South Korea’s largest and oldest free economic zone, established in 
2003 and due to be completed in 2020 with the aim of becoming one of the top three economic 
zones in the world. Ecuador signed a Memorandum of Understanding with IFEZ in 2010.90 It has 
drawn on South Korea’s broader development experience through the development cooperation 
Knowledge Sharing Programme. This has provided Korean expertise on various sectors, including 
research and development, human resources and biotechnology.91  In making these connections, the 
‘national’ discourse of Ecuador’s development imaginary comes into conversation with the global 
imperatives of free economic zones.92   
At the heart of Yachay is a new research intensive university, Yachay Tech, which will be surrounded 
by research institutes and a technology park with a focus on agriculture and biotechnology. At 
Yachay Tech’s official opening in March 2014, Ecuador’s Higher Education, Science, Technology & 
Innovation Minister, Ramirez Gallegos, proclaimed:   
‘If the petroleum boom of our country was born on 26 July 1972 … we hope that today 
Monday 31 March 2014 generates a new boom, the knowledge boom… Here the new nation 
is being born, here we are overcoming the extractivist economy’93 
Yachay is, to a certain extent, inspired by the California Institute of Technology (Cal Tech), the 
world’s most highly ranked university for the last four years.94 Indeed, despite Yachay’s obvious 
association with national identity, the university is global in both its aims and composition, reflecting 
the government’s development view that ‘transforming the productive structure assumes 
interaction with the scientific and technological cutting edge.’95  The president, chairperson and vice-
chairperson of the Board of Trustees, are all current engineering faculty at Cal Tech, who visit Yachay 
Tech.  The Board’s president, Jose Andrade, argues that ‘like me, all world class academics work at 
several entities.  Our role is to connect the University with the world and to be able to do that we 
need to be with one foot in and the other foot out.’96  How that is successfully navigated to create 
an Ecuadorian scientific powerhouse to change the structure of the economy is strongly debated 
within the country and was one of the reasons for the demise of the former rector of Yachay Tech.97 
Yachay is one aspect of a wider, far-reaching revolution in Ecuador’s higher education system, 
instigated by the Correa government and guided by two principles: improving both research and 
teaching quality, and ensuring access to previously excluded groups such as indigenous Ecuadorians 
and Afro-Ecuadorians. Both these principles had been abandoned under decades of neoliberalism.98 
Ecuador now invests 2.1 per cent of GDP in higher education, higher than the OECD average and the 
highest proportion in Latin America.99 The 2008 Constitution established the right to free education 
from primary school to university level for all citizens. In addition to Yachay, the government has 
created three more new universities: the University for the Arts in Guayaquil, a University of 
Education in Azogues and Ikiam (Shuar for forest) University of Biodiversity in Tena.  Historically, 
Ecuador’s university system has focused on teaching, less than five per cent of staff have PhDs and 
there has been little research funding or culture.100 10,000 students have now received full 
scholarships to study at universities abroad in North America, Latin America, Europe and Asia. 
Ecuador provides the highest number of scholarships per capita in the continent and third highest in 
the world. Two thirds of the scholarships have been for postgraduate studies and nearly all the 
students have returned to work in Ecuador.101  
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Undoubtedly, even as the government chose to celebrate eight years of the Citizens Revolution at 
Yachay and designated 2015 the Year of Knowledge in Ecuador, many questions remain. The 
discourse of Ecuador’s twenty-first century developmentalism is a confluence of many sources, 
internal and external. Its development plans have been strongly influenced by the discourse of 
international heterodox economists whilst the government’s promotion of a knowledge economy 
has to confront a highly competitive and commodified world of neoliberal academia. Is there an 
intrinsic contradiction between using oil to fund a post-oil economy, that ‘the continuity of 
extractivism will reproduce the same prevalent socioeconomic and power logic’?102 Given the 
international community’s eschewal of the government’s innovative environmental compensation 
scheme, what other alternatives exist to fund the transition to a post-oil economy?103 How can the 
government pursue a social knowledge economy under the pressure of cognitive capitalism?  Can 
the government now maintain higher education as a public good or will it reproduce academic 
capitalism with its innate competitive and commodification processes?104 Will the Right take power 
either via orchestrated instability or at the 2017 election and reverse the Citizens Revolution? Will 
the government’s Yachay vision succeed in its own terms?  What is clear is that the strong discursive 
and substantive commitment to move away from extractivism towards a knowledge economy is an 
attempt to liberate Ecuador from a cycle of dependency in which ‘without independence there is no 
Nation. Yachay is building the Patria’.105  Speaking at the University of Santiago in Chile on accepting 
an honorary doctorate in recognition of the country’s educational reforms, President Correa noted 
Ecuador’s exceptional investment in higher education and asked ‘this is our future, why not invest in 
it?’106 
5. Conclusions 
The two case studies of Ghana and Ecuador, though evidently different in terms of their political 
economic histories, have been used in this paper with the same purpose. Namely, they have both 
sought to show how the study of so-called neo-extractivism can be strengthened by including a 
cultural dimension which highlights the political importance of language. We have shown how 
language itself is simultaneously used to define ‘new’ resource nations, imagine new development 
futures and to legitimise the particular resource policy directions required in order to bring 
structural change into being. Emphasising the importance of the politics of language strengthens the 
literature on the ‘return of the state’ in resource politics and geographies. In the context of this 
paper, we have highlighted the role that resource extraction plays in the construction of 
development imaginaries. Development plans and political statements and actions are shaped and 
legitimised by mobilising a discursive engagement with 1) time and 2) with an unwavering belief in 
the value of the ‘nation’ as a unifying and enabling mechanism for policy formation.   
In the first instance, the discursive engagement with time is noticeable in the political imaginaries of 
both Ecuador and Ghana where it is encountered and mobilised in two directions – forwards and 
backwards. In Ecuador, the politics of Buen Vivir is invoked in imagining a development future based 
on a knowledge economy but fuelled by the extractive economy. It is not a short term future of the 
type usually seen in ‘5-year plans’ but rather a prospect that is imagined several decades away. The 
Ecuadorian experience is both a classic restatement of social democratic developmentalism which is 
state-centric, redistributionist and sovereign, as well as innovating on a long-term transitional 
strategy to become a post-extractive knowledge economy. In Ghana, a similar ‘politics of potential’ is 
evident but this time with its natural resources imagined as an ongoing motor for development. 
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However, this time the promise of future economic progress is legitimised by invoking a backwards-
facing past of nation-building with its strong rhetorical reproduction of the tenets of nationally-
controlled resources.  
In the second instance, the nation is imagined as a unified and singular unit of analysis. Implicit in 
this discursive strategy is the understanding that the structural transformation of resource sectors 
towards increased state control can herald more equitable distribution of their benefits. However, 
despite its rhetorical strength it fails to recognise the plurality of voices found within the nation 
itself. Because the idea of a unified state, discursively realised in both case studies, is necessarily 
constructed and reductive in scope, what does that mean for progressive political debate concerning 
resource sovereignty? We have shown how the ‘one-nation’ discourse rationalises resource policy 
but what does that mean to those voices who challenge it? What role does the language of political 
identity in resource frontiers (onshore and offshore, subnational, national and international etc.) 
play in shaping such political action? These questions, and others besides, are for future enquiries 
into extractivism (both ‘new’ and ‘old’) but they should all include an engagement with the politics 
of language and how it is translated into development strategies.  
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